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No. 20100648

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

RON THAYER and CATHIE THAYER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; CITY OF SAINT GEORGE;
ROBERT GOULDING; MICHAEL EATON; STACY RICHAN; DAVID
AMODT; JOHN and JANE DOES I-X; ABC CORPORATIONS I-X; and XYZ
PARTNERSHIPS I-X,
Defendants.

WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT'S REPLY BRIEF

The Defendant Washington County School District (District) responds to
Plaintiffs' brief on a certified question of law.

Summary of the Argument
Plaintiffs' brief is telling not for what it states, but for what it does not.
Plaintiffs' brief ignores the language of Plaintiffs' complaint. The brief ignores
the approval exception's plain language. And the brief overlooks this Court's
prior, settled precedent respecting the exception's proper reach. But more

importantly, Plaintiffs' brief ignores the question certified by this Court and seeks
instead to answer a question of Plaintiffs' own design.
The District previously detailed the several reasons to cloak its conduct
with sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs' brief quiets none. This Court should
accordingly find that Plaintiffs' negligence claims are barred by the approval
exception to Utah's Immunity Act.

Argument
The Court's Order accepting the certified question is clear and
unambiguous. That order plainly asks whether "the conduct of the school district
officials and those acting on the school's behalf, constitute the issuance of a
'permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization,' under Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) such that the state actors are entitled to immunity
from liability pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act?" The School
District affirmatively answered that question. Plaintiffs fail to answer the question
at all.1

1

But on page 6 of their brief, Plaintiffs set out an entirely different
question than the one certified by this Court. And curiously, Plaintiffs have failed
to answer even that question.
2

I.

PLAINTIFFS IGNORE THE QUESTION CERTIFIED BY THIS
COURT, BUT THAT QUESTION SHOULD BE ANSWERED
AFFIRMATIVELY.
Plaintiffs' opening brief is flawed. Plaintiffs have not told this Court why

the District's conduct or that of its employees did not constitute an approval or
similar authorization protected by the approval exception to Utah's Immunity Act.
Instead, Plaintiffs have told this Court that the approval exception does not apply
to alleged, operational conduct, and that operational decisions must be analyzed
under the discretionary function exception.
In answering a question posed by them and not this Court, Plaintiffs have
necessarily ignored the language of their own complaint, the language of the
approval exception, and this Court's prior decisions that have analyzed and
broadly applied that exception. This Court should similarly ignore and not
consider Plaintiffs' extraneous arguments. But the Court should grant the District
immunity from Plaintiffs' negligence claims.

A.

Plaintiffs Ignore the Allegations Contained in Their Own
Complaint.

When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court accepts
the factual allegations in the plaintiffs complaint as true, drawing all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Healthcare Servs. Grp.y Inc. v. Utah Dep't
3

of Health, 2002 UT 5, \ 3,40 P.3d 591. The District set out the relevant facts
from Plaintiffs' complaint on pages 5 to 7 of its opening brief. And on pages 9 to
10 of that brief, the District restated verbatim Plaintiffs' claim that their son's
tragic death arose from a high school vice principal's decision to approve and
authorize a parent to transport, possess, maintain, and discharge a handgun,
shooting blanks, to enhance the sound effects during rehearsals and performances
of a high school play.
Plaintiffs recount that story on pages 10 to 11 of their initial brief. But that
factual recitation is bereft of the words "approve," "authorize," or their
derivatives. Plaintiffs cannot dodge their complaint by recasting an express
approval as a simple act of giving "consent." See Plas' Opening Br., p. 10
("Goulding and Richan consented to utilization of the handgun in the play ....").
But Plaintiffs' own allegations, when viewed in a light most favorable to them,
make clear that Tucker Thayer's untimely death arose out of a District employee's
decision to approve and authorize the use of a handgun, shooting blanks, on
school property. Compare Plas' Opening Br., pp. 10-11 with doc. 2, Compl. ffl[
13,22-23,31-32,35-36,77-78, 105, 111, 115, 121, 127, 145, 152. Those facts
support the District's sovereign immunity under the Immunity Act's plain

4

language. This Court should find Plaintiffs' negligence claims are barred under
that Act's approval exception.

B.

Plaintiffs Ignore the Plain Language of the Immunity Act.

Plaintiffs also ignore the plain language of Utah's Immunity Act. Pertinent
here, that Act states:
Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not
waived . . . if the injury arises out of, in connection with,
or results from... (c) the issuance, denial, suspension,
or revocation of, or by failure or refusal to issue, deny,
suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization.
Id. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have failed to explain why that
broad, unambiguous language does not bar their state law claims. See Francis v.
State, 2010 UT 62, ^ 15, 17,

P.3d

; see also, Moss v. Pete Suazo Athletic

Comm 'n, 2007 UT 99,fflf13, 15, 175 P.3d 1042.
The approval exception is not limited to only "regulatory functions" or to
discretionary conduct that goes beyond "the ministerial actions of a government
employee in [its] day-to-day operations." See Plas' Opening Br., pp. 15-16.
Absent from the face of the approval exception are the terms "regulate" or
"discretion." But present instead, are the terms "approval" and "similar
authorization." .See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c). Plaintiffs' injury arose
5

out of and is causally connected to the Vice Principal Goulding's approval or
similar authorization. Plaintiffs' attempt, here, to read new terms into or to "place
a condition on the applicability of the [approval] exception without any textual
justification" is improper. See Moss, 2007 UT 99, ^ 13; Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch.
DisL, 2002 UT 130,ffij57-58, 63 P.3d 705 (Assoc. C.J., Durrant, writing for
majority).
The Utah Legislature has plainly spoken, and this Court has previously
ruled that the Immunity Act bars all negligence claims arising out of any approval
or similar authorization. See Moss, 2007 UT 99, % 15 (licensing exception's broad
language applies equally to "approvals and similar authorizations"); see also
Gillman v. Utah Dep 't of Fin, Inst, 782 P.2d 506, 511-12 (Utah 1989) (finding
predecessor to section 63G-7-301(5)(c) "bars all negligence actions that arise out
of any licensing decision") (emphasis added). Plaintiffs point to no case law to
support their preferred, restrictive reading of the approval exception.

C.

Plaintiffs Ignore the Governing Law.

Finally, Plaintiffs do not seriously acknowledge or analyze this Court's
common law precedent under the approval exception. Plaintiffs essentially ignore
that authority. Instead, Plaintiffs rely on inapposite law to support their contention

6

that the approval exception should not be interpreted broadly; that exception, they
contend, mirrors and has been supplanted by a restrictive analysis associated with
the discretionary function exception to the State's general waiver of immunity.
Though Plaintiffs cite to Moss, they ignore the fact the Court rejected a
narrow reading of the approval exception, and held instead that subsection 301(5)(c) "is not restricted to those decisions that constitute licensing decisions
per se[; r]ather, it extends to approvals and similar authorizations." Id., 2007 UT
99, \13 (emphasis added); but see Plas' Opening Br., p. 21 ("[T]his [C]ourt found
the commission was immune from suit under the licensing exception because its
challenged decision was directly related to the licensing activity it was endowed
by law to perform.") Plaintiffs also do not cite the Court's decision in Gillman v.
Department of Financial Institutions, 782 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989). There, the Court
considered at length Section 63-30-10(3) - the predecessor to Section 63G-7301(5)(c) - and consequently rejected Gillman's similar attempt to view a
challenged licensing action through the lens of discretionary conduct. Id. at 509512.2 Finally, Plaintiffs overlook this Court's recent decision in Francis, where albeit in dicta - the Court rejected the need for formality in applying the approval

2

The District addresses the Plaintiffs' discretionary function contentions
and the Court's decision in Gillman at Point II, below.
7

exception, but recognized the State's claim that when a plaintiff paid a required
entrance fee, the federal government implicitly authorized the plaintiff to camp on
federal land. Id., 2010 UT 62, \ 13.
Instead, Plaintiffs rely chiefly on the Court's 2002 decision in Healthcare
Services Group, Inc. v. Utah Department of Health, 2002 UT 5, 40 P.3d 59, and
they claim that the Court's "reasoning" in that case "applies with equal force"
here. See Plas' Opening Br., p. 17. But this Court did not analyze the approval
exception's reach in that case. Instead, the Court merely rejected that exception.
There, Healthcare Services Group (HSG) appealed a district court order
barring, in part, HSG's conversion claim. Id., 2002 UT 5, f 1. That claim
stemmed from HSG's contractual relationship with a long-term healthcare
provider (the provider) who operated two nursing homes in the state of Utah. In
1989, HSG and the provider entered into a contract whereby HSG agreed to
provide laundry services to the nursing home facilities. Id. at \ 6. The provider
failed to pay HSG as agreed, and in 1993, HSG perfected a security interest in the
provider's accounts and receivables - including its state medicaid
reimbursements. Id. Then in 1995 and 1996, the federal Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) imposed civil fines and penalties against the provider for
violations of federal law. Id. at \ 7. Thereafter, the State assumed management of
8

one of the nursing homes, id. at % 4, and at HCFA's request, the State began to
withhold and pay the provider's medicaid reimbursements to HCFA to satisfy the
provider's civil penalties. Id. at \ 7.
HSG sued, claiming that its perfected security interest took priority over
HCFA's civil penalties and that the State's actions constituted a tortious
conversion. Id. at f 8. The district court dismissed that claim, finding it was
alternatively barred by the discretionary function, licensing/approval, inspection,
and negligent misrepresentation exceptions to the Utah Immunity Act. Id. at f 27.
HSG appealed. This Court addressed each exception, in turn. See id.ffif28-30.
Pertinent here is the Court's out-of-hand rejection of the State's claim that it
was shielded from liability because its conduct arose out of the State's
"involvement in regulating and licensing" the provider. The Court stated
[t]his claim has nothing to do with the 'issuance, denial,
suspension or revocation of. .. any permit, license,
certificate, approval or similar authorization.' Rather,
the claim is based on a perfected security interest and
seeks recovery of funds wrongfully paid to another
party.
Id. (citation omitted).
The Court did not analyze the State's licensing claim. And the Court did
not consider - converse to Plaintiffs' suggestion - whether the State's alleged

9

licensing actions were ministerial or discretionary.3 It did not have to. To resolve
the State's licensing claim, the Court needed look only to whether the State's
conduct was related to an underlying license or approval. It was not; and the
Court so found. Id. This decision is inapposite and of no value to the Court or the
parties here.
Plaintiffs next point to McCormick v. Carroll, 600 S.E. 2d 576 (W. Va.
2004), a case that is factually and legally distinct. There, the West Virginia
Supreme Court stated that the rationale for that state's similar exception "relate[d]
to immunity for a political subdivision for liability for injuries that are caused by
the conduct of a private party who obtains a permit or license for that conduct
from the political subdivision." Id. at 581. Utah law is not similarly constrained.
Utah's courts have long found that the approval exception immunizes a
government entity from its own, alleged negligence arising out of a permit,
license, approval or similar authority. Here, Plaintiffs seek to hold the

3

That language pertained only to the Court's analysis under the
discretionary function exception to the State's immunity waiver. See Id. at \ 28;
see also Utah Code Ann. 63G-7-301(5)(a) (retaining the State's immunity for
injuries arising out of "the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or
perform, a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused.") Here,
the District raised and the federal court asked this Court to consider whether
Plaintiffs' injury arose out of an approval or similar authorization. Plaintiffs'
discretionary function analysis is non-responsive. See discussion, pp. 19-23, infra.
10

Washington County School District liable for the District's own conduct in
approving the presence of the handgun that led to Tucker Thayer's death. The
Carroll court's analysis is not germane.
Plaintiffs also mistakenly rely on Watson v. Apache County, 189 P.3d 1085
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). Plaintiffs correctly note the similarities between the
Arizona approval statute and Section 63G-7-301(5)(c), but they disregard the
fundamental differences in the way that Arizona courts construe that state's
immunity act.
In Arizona, "[sjtatutes granting immunity . . . are construed narrowly to give
effect to the policy 'that public entities are liable for acts and omissions of
employees in accordance with the statutes and common law of [the] state.'"
Watson, 189 P.3d at 1089. But in Utah, this Court has consistently acknowledged
the necessity of governmental immunity in protecting the delivery of government
services. See Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976) (holding that in
enacting Immunity Act, the legislature "recognized the necessity of immunity as
essential to the protections of the State in rendering the many and ever increasing
number of governmental services."). The Court, therefore, construes statutory
wording strictly, see Hall v. Utah Dep't ofCorrs., 2001 UT 34, \ 14, 24 P.3d 968,
972, and applies the Act's "protective sweep" broadly to preserve the immunity
11

expressed on the face of the act. See Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.3d
159, 162 (Utah 1996). But even despite those analytical differences and the fact
that the Court denied immunity in Watson, the Arizona Court's reasoning is
relevant here.
In Watson, property owners sought to build a fence around two, adjacent
lots that were bounded on one side by a private easement. Prior to constructing
the fence, on behalf of both property owners, Mrs. Watson approached the county
to investigate the procedure for filing an abandonment of easement. Id. at 1087.
Mrs. Watson spoke with four County employees in three separate departments assessor, zoning, and county attorney, respectively. Id. Each confirmed Mrs.
Watson's understanding that the easement was private and that the property
owners could fence the lots so long as the fence contained a gate and that the gate
was kept unlocked. Id.
The property owners constructed the fence, but were soon contacted by a
neighbor who threatened a lawsuit if the fence were not removed. Id. The
property owners did not remove the fence and the neighbors sued. Id. The
Watsons filed a third-party complaint against the County, alleging the employees
to whom Mrs. Watson spoke made fraudulent misrepresentations and were
therefore negligent. M a t 1188. The County moved for summary judgment,
12

arguing that because Mrs. Watson had sought advice about where to construct the
fence, she had also sought the County's approval to build the fence. Id. A trial
court granted the County's motion and the Watsons appealed. Id. at 1089.
Construing the statute narrowly, the Arizona court observed that "approval"
was one of several terms used in the statute,4 and that it involved "more official
government action than is implicated by an employee's opinion in response to an
individual's question." Id. But given its proper context, the court found, "the
word 'approval' is that of an 'authorization,' and, in turn, 'authorization' has been
defined as 'legal power or right; sanction,' while 'authorize' has been defined as
'to give official approval or legal power to;' and '[t]o empower; to give a right or
authority to act.'" Id. (internal citations omitted). The court concluded, that when
the term approval was thus analyzed, "Mrs. Watson was not seeking the County's
permission to build the fence - she did not need it - but only information that
[Mrs. Watson] believed that the County employees could readily provide to her."
Id.

4

That statute read "[ujnless a public employee acting within the scope of
the public employee's employment intended to cause injury or was grossly
negligent, neither a public entity nor a public employee [was] liable for . . . [t]he
issuance of or failure to revoke or suspend any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization for which absolute immunity it not
provided." A.R.S. f 12.820.02(A)(5).
13

Using that definition, the District's conduct is immune. Because here, the
Safe School Policy precluded the presence or use of a gun on school property.
Accordingly, when Mr. Eaton sought out SRO Richan, and SRO Richan in turn
sought out Vice Principal Goulding, neither wanted an opinion. But Mr. Eaton
needed permission and an approval as an exception to policy, to permit a parent to
transport, maintain, and use a .38 caliber handgun, loaded with blanks, to enhance
the sound effects during a high school play. Vice Principal Goulding gave that
permission and Plaintiffs' tragic injuries arose out the same. This Court should
therefore find that the District is immune.
Finally, Plaintiffs claim that when the Utah Legislature enacted the approval
exception, it intended that public employees be immune only for their policymaking discretion in determining whether to issue a permit, license, approval, or
similar authorization in the first instance. See Plas' Opening Br., p. 20. But
Plaintiffs cite only 57 American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Municipal,
County, School, and State Tort Liability, Section 180 (Nov. 2010), to support that
claim. Telling, is the fact that Plaintiffs point to no authority from this Court or
the legislature to verify their broad, general statement of legislative intent.
Moreover, the District has searched, but has found no expressions of the Utah
Legislature's purpose for enacting approval immunity. But that section has been a
14

part of Utah's Immunity Act since its inception. See Utah Legislative Council,
Report of the Governmental Immunity Committee (Dec. 1964).
Converse to Plaintiffs, the District set out the relevant authority in their
Opening Brief to this Court. That authority governs and bars Plaintiffs' several
negligence claims.

II.

PLAINTIFFS' INJURY AROSE OUT OF THE DISTRICT'S
IMMUNE DECISION TO AUTHORIZE AND APPROVE, AS AN
EXCEPTION TO POLICY, THE USE OF A HANDGUN, SHOOTING
BLANKS, DURING REHEARSALS AND PERFORMANCES OF A
HIGH SCHOOL PLAY.
When determining whether a challenged action is barred by an exception to

the State's general waiver of immunity, this Court necessarily focuses "on the
conduct or situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of liability
crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged." Ledfors v. Emery
County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Utah 1993). The Court regularly denies a
plaintiffs claim when it has been recast to evade a statutory exception "by
recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury." Id. at 1166-67; see also Taylor
v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 164 (Utah 1996); see also Tiede v. State,
915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996); Malcolm v. State, 878 P.2d 1144, 1146-47 (Utah
1994).

15

Here, Plaintiffs attempt to fashion a theory of liability by claiming that their
son's death arose not out of a protected approval, but from a ministerial decision
and the District's alleged negligence in carrying out that decision; conduct
Plaintiffs claim falls without the scope of the discretionary function exception.
See Plas' Opening Br., pp. 26-28; Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(a). But the
predominant issue before this Court is whether the District is immune from
liability for Plaintiffs' injuries under the approval exception. See Utah Code
section 63G-7-301(5)(c). Because Plaintiffs' injury arose out of a high school
principal's approval of use of a handgun, shooting blanks, during rehearsals and
performances of a school play, the approval exception bars Plaintiffs' negligence
claims.
A.

Plaintiffs' Analysis Reads the Approval Exception Out of
Utah's Immunity Act and Renders that Section
Superfluous.

When interpreting a statute, this Court gives effect to the purpose and
intent of the legislature. Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, ^f 12,
48 P.3d 949. The Court considers the meaning of each term and "avoid[s]
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous." Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Utah's Immunity Act is comprehensive in

16

scope. Read harmoniously, section 63G-7-301(4) waives the State's sovereign
immunity for negligent acts, and sections 63G-7-301(5)(a) through 63G-7301(5)(u), restore that immunity for injuries arising out specific types of
negligence, including injuries that arise out of approvals or similar authorizations.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301; see also Gllman, 782 P.2d at 508.
Plaintiffs acknowledge this statutory scheme, but they argue that by
broadly interpreting the approval exception, the Court will render meaningless the
general waiver of immunity set out in Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(4) and the
specific waiver for dangerous or defective conditions set out in section 63G-7301(3). See Plas' Opening Br., p. 22-25. But the Court has confronted similar
claims and found them wanting. See Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT 38,fflf27-29, 212
P.3d 547 ("[0]ur case law shows that [plaintiff] fear that the government will be
immune from all acts of negligence - is unfounded.") Moreover, the cases cited by
Plaintiffs on page 23 of their brief belie this concern.
Finally, Plaintiffs' claim that the approval exception immunizes
governmental entities only from claims arising out of discretionary approvals or
licensing decisions, itself, violates a fundamental tenet of statutory construction.
But Utah's courts are constrained from interpreting the Immunity Act in a way
that will render the approval exception superfluous. See Grappendorf, 2007 UT
17

84, ^| 12. And those courts must, whenever possible, interpret the plain language
of any statute to give effect to all of the statutory terms. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT
19, Tf 17, 5 P.3d 616. On its face, the approval exception bars all negligence
claims arising out of any approval or similar authorization. See Utah Code Ann. \
63G-7-301(5)(c) (emphasis added). That exception retains the District's immunity
here.
Certainly, this Court has, from time-to-time, criticized the Immunity Act,
but the Court has also recognized that "the legislature has spoken with clarity on
the question of immunity," and that the Court is accordingly "constrained by the
plain language of the Act and [by] prior case law on this point." Ledfors, 849 P.2d
at 1167; see In re S.H.,S65 P.2d 1363, 1365 and at 1366 (Hall, C.J., dissenting);
Malcolm, 878 P.2d at 1147; Tiede, 915 P.2d at 504. It is thus not for Plaintiffs to
tailor the State's waiver of immunity more narrowly or to find that a government
entity's approvals are immune only to they extent they also constitute,
discretionary acts. Plaintiffs' injuries arose out of a high school vice principal's
decision to approve and authorize a parent to transport, maintain, and use a
handgun, shooting blanks, at rehearsals and performances of a school play. This
Court should therefore bar Plaintiffs' negligence claims.

18

B.

The Discretionary Function Exception to Utah's Immunity Act is
Inapposite to the Certified Question.

This Court asked the parties to answer whether the District's conduct
constituted the issuance of an approval or similar authorization, such that the state
actors were immune from Plaintiffs' suit. Plaintiffs have not answered that
question; instead at Point C of their brief, Plaintiffs have told this Court that
because the District engaged only in operational conduct, the discretionary
function exception bars the District's immunity.
1. Stare decisis promotes the District's sovereign immunity.
Plaintiffs cannot shield themselves from dismissal merely by arguing that
Vice Principal Goulding's approval constituted unprotected operational (i.e.,
nondiscretionary) conduct. See Plas' Opening Br., pp. 26-28. But this Court
previously considered and rejected a plaintiffs attempt to skirt approval immunity
by arguing that an injury arose not from a protected license, but from the breach of
a nondiscretionary duty. See Gillman, 782 P.2d 506, 508-511 (Utah 1989)
(rejecting claim and broadly interpreting reach of approval exception); see also
Moss, 2007 UT 99, % 15. "Those asking [the Court] to overturn prior precedent
have a substantial burden of persuasion." See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398
(Utah 1994). Plaintiffs have not met that substantial burden here.
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2.

This Court's prior decision in Gillman supports the wholesale
rejection of Plaintiffs' claims here.

In Gillman, Gillman, a bankruptcy trustee, brought an investors' lawsuit
against the Utah Department of Financial Institutions (the Department), claiming
that it failed to properly regulate two failed thrifts. Id. at 508. The trial court
granted the Department's summary judgment motion under the discretionary
function, licensing, and inspection exceptions to the Act's general waiver of
immunity. Id. at 509. Gillman appealed, and like Plaintiffs, Gillman attempted to
recast his arguments to avoid those exceptions.
Gillman's arguments were twofold. First, he attempted to avoid the
discretionary function exception by arguing that the investors' injury arose from
the Department's breach of a nondiscretionary duty, orfromthe Department's
negligent, nondiscretionary implementation of its discretionary licensing
authority. Id. Gillman also attempted to skirt the approval/licensing exception, by
arguing that the investors' injury arose notfroma licencing decision, butfromthe
Department's failure to ensure that the thrifts adhered to conditions that the
Department placed on the operating licenses in the first instance. Id. The Court
examined each argument, but found that because all of the investors' injuries arose
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out of a licensing decision, the Department was immune. Id.5 That analysis
remains binding today.
The Court analyzed Gillman's first argument in two steps. First, the Court
addressed Gillman's claim that the investors' losses arose from the Department's
nondiscretionary duty to supervise the thrifts' credit operations. But the Court
determined that because the only sanction that the Department could have
imposed on the failed thrifts was "to suspend or revoke" their operating licenses,
the investors' alleged injury resulted from "a failure to suspend or revoke" those
licenses - an immune act. Id. at 510-511.
The Court also considered, but rejected the second part of Gillman's
discretionary function argument and claim that although the Department's
decision to approve the thrifts' lending applications was discretionary, the
ministerial acts necessary to implement that decision were not. Id. at 511.6 The
5

The Court stated

An examination of Gillman's arguments in detail demonstrates that
at their heart, all are futile attempts to obscure the fact that the claims
asserted are for injuries arising out of licensing decisions allegedly
made in a negligent fashion. As such, they are all immune from suit

Id. at 509.
6

The Court aptly observed
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Court easily disposed of that claim, stating:
Again, it is section [the licensing exception], not section
[the discretionary function exception], that is the
relevant provision because the injury necessarily 'arises
out of the licensing decision, and section [63G-7301(5)(c)] bars all negligence actions that arise out of
any licensing decision.
Id. (emphasis added).
Finally, the Court considered Gillman's second, substantive claim and
attempt to impose liability on the Department not for its licensing decisions, but
for the Department's alleged, negligent failure to ensure the thrifts complied with
conditions that the Department imposed on their licenses. Id. at 511-12.7 The

Gillman thus seeks to bring his claims within the scope of this
Court's decisions holding that section [63G-7-301(5)(a)] provides no
protection from suit for injury caused by the negligent
implementation of an immunized discretionary decision.
Id. at 511 (citing Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985); Little v. Utah State
Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983).
7

The Court characterized that claim as follows:

In an attempt to avoid [the licensing exception], Gillman argues that
the injury in question actually flowed not from a licensing decision
covered by [that section], but from the breach of a common law duty
of care owed to the public.
Id.
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Court found no merit to that claim, and held:
The Department preconditioned the approval of Thrift's
application to operate, as it was empowered to do. The
failure to comply with those preconditions could only
mean that the approval would not be effective or that it
would be subject to revocation. In either event, the
injury resulting from a failure to ensure that the
conditions had been complied with or to speedily detect
noncompliance again 'arises out of a licensing decision
as that is broadly defined in section [63G-7-301(5)(c)].
M a t 512.
Gillman remains good law, and it forecloses Plaintiffs' attempt to recast the
certified question. But close examination of Plaintiffs' arguments demonstrates
their futility. Despite Plaintiffs' earnest attempt to blur the facts alleged by their
own complaint, Plaintiffs' various negligence claims seek recovery for an injury
that arose squarely from the District's approval, whether negligently made or
implemented. Thus, Plaintiffs' discretionary function claims aside, the District is
immune from Plaintiffs' suit.
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Conclusion
Utah's Immunity Act confers immunity on local school districts for injuries
that arise out of, occur in connection with, or result from an approval or similar
authorization. Plaintiffs concede that Tucker Thayer's tragic death arose out of
Robert Goulding's decision, made as an exception to the District's Safe School
Policy, to authorize and approve a parent to transport, possess, maintain, and use a
handgun, shooting blanks, during rehearsals and performances of a high school
play. That conduct gives rise to the District's immunity under the plain language
of the approval exception to the Immunity Act. It also gives rise to the District's
immunity under settled, Utah law. The Court should therefore find that the
District remains immune from Plaintiffs' negligence suit and, consequently, affirm
the question certified to it.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 30th day of March, 2011.

^(a,tevmw5
^BRIDG^T K. ROMANO
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants

24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing WASHINGTON
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT'S REPLY BRIEF was served by U.S. Postal
Service, postage prepaid this 30th day of March, 2011 to the following:

MICHAEL I. WELKER
JEFFREY C. WILCOX
JASON N. DIXON
GALLIAN WILCOX WELKER OLSON
& BECKSTROM
965 E 700 S STE 305
ST GEORGE UT 84790

JOHN COLLINS
LINDSEY LAW FIRM
920 MITCHELL ST
CLOVIS NM 88101

PETER STIRBA
BRET W RAWSON
STEPHANIE L WARNER
JULIA D KYTE
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES
215 S STATE ST STE 750
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110

&

U/Mim.

'Cjfcte/fa..

